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I. INTRODUCTION 
By the Respondent's Brief in this matter, it is apparent that the City of Stanley ("City") 
has a rather cavalier attitude about its responsibilities under the Idaho Open Meeting Law, Idaho 
Code §§ 67-2340 through 67-2347. Indeed, at no point throughout the Respondent's Brief does 
the City actually contest the central fact of this case: the City Council meeting at which 
Ordinance 189 was passed was convened approximately a full half-hour prior to the time noticed 
under Idaho Code § 67-2343. The City actually concedes this fact: "That the 
hearings/deliberations began early is not at issue." (Respondent's Brief, p. 6.) 'Not at issue,' the 
Arnolds' submit, is the City's way of attempting to distract this Court away from the fact that 
there is no dispute here that there was a violation of the Idaho Open Meeting Law. The City does 
not appear to be bothered by, or at all apologetic for, its own disregard for its legal obligations to 
its citizenry. 
The facts, then, are exactly as set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief: 
On August 9, 2012 at 5:31 p.m., approximately twenty-nine (29) 
minutes before the scheduled time for the City Council Meeting, 
the Mayor of the City convened a City Council meeting to make 
decisions and/or to deliberate toward decisions, including a 
decision and/or deliberation on Ordinance No. 189 (the "5 :31 p.m. 
Meeting"). (R. at 34, 36 (i! 14).) The City had not provided any 
meeting notice or agenda notice for a City Council meeting to be 
held on August 9, 2012 at 5:31 p.m. (R. at 34, 37 (iT 15).) Though 
the City posted a meeting notice and agenda notice for a regular 
City Council meeting to be held on August 9, 2012 at 6:00 p.m., 
such notice did not notify interested parties of a meeting that 
actually started at 5:31 p.m. (R. at 34, 37 (i! 16), 54 (Ex. E).) The 
City did not amend the agenda that the City used at the 5:31 p.m. 
Meeting. The City proceeded to then hear matters that were not on 
the agenda for the City Council meeting scheduled for 6:00 p.m. 
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(R. at 34, 37 (~ 16), 54 (Ex. F).) At the 5:31 p.m. Meeting, 
other actions, the City enacted Ordinance No. 189, ,,hich 
Ordinance adversely affects Plaintiffs' rights with respect to the 
Property. (R. at 34, 37 (if 17), 75 (Ex. G).) All of the starting and 
ending times of the various hearings and meetings relevant hereto 
are noted in the Official Minutes of the August 9, 2012 
proceedings, meaning there is can be no dispute that the facts 
material to this case evidence a failure by the City of Stanley to 
comply with its own published notices and agendas for those 
proceedings, and therefore no dispute that the City's actions did in 
fact violate Idaho's Open Meeting Law. (See R. at 34, 3 7 (if 16), 
54 (Ex. F).) 
(Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 3-4.) 
In view of the foregoing, admitted violation of the Idaho Open Meeting Law, and 
pursuant to the plain language of Idaho Code § 67-2347(1), the action taken during the City 
Council meeting on August 9, 2012 "shall be null and void": 
If an action, or any deliberation or decision[-]making that leads to 
an action, occurs at any meeting which fails to comply with the 
provisions of sections 67-2340 through 67-2346, Idaho Code, such 
action shall be null and void. 
Idaho Code § 67-2347(1) (emphasis added). The Legislature has therefore enacted an 
unequivocally broad protective statute for the people of Idaho, to protect against the very sort of 
cavalier abuse of power that the City has seemingly boasted about in this matter. Rather than 
acknowledge that the Idaho Legislature provided statutory standing to the broad class of people 
who may in any number of ways - be "affected by" a violation of the Open Meeting Law, the 
City has engaged in gamesmanship regarding the meaning of "affected by," urging a result that 
will open a floodgates' worth of opportunity for it to willfully, albeit carefully, shirk its 
responsibilities to the people of the City of Stanley. 
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By ignoring the somewhat obvious fact that one can be "affected by" something in a 
multitude of ways, and instead narrowing the class of persons "affected by" a violation to that 
class which best fits the exigencies of this litigation, the City was forced to ignore the plain 
language of the statute. The City states: "Arnold asserts that the two words: 'affected by' should 
be extended to any property owner dissatisfied or 'actually affected' by the underlying 
substantive result; the text of the zoning ordinance. This virtually throws open the courthouse 
doors." (Respondent's Brief, p. 8.) If it is true that such an interpretation "throws open the 
courthouse doors," the City's quarrel on this point is not with the Arnolds, but with the Idaho 
Legislature. The plain and unambiguous language of the Open Meeting Law states: 
Any suit brought for the purpose of having an action declared or 
determined to be null and void pursuant to subsection (1) of this 
section shall be commenced within thirty (30) days of the time of 
the decision or action that results, in whole or in part, from a 
meeting that failed to comply with the provisions of this act. 
Idaho Code § 67-2347(6). Moreover, and perhaps more fundamentally, the City's grave 
prediction that the "courthouse doors" will be "throw[ n] open" is only true if, and only if, 
governmental entities like the City of Stanley decide not to comply with the rather simple 
requirements of the Open Meeting Law. If the City complies with its straightforward obligations 
under the law, there really is no problem. It seems, then, that the Legislature's purpose and the 
goal of the Open Meeting law is actually accomplished - not thwarted by the interpretation that 
the City would now like to avoid. If compliance with the law is too difficult for the City 
Officials, then the problem seems to be internal, and not of the Arnolds' making. 
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Further on the facts of this case, it remains undisputed by the City that Ordinance 189 -
an "action that result[ ed]" from the meeting that was held in violation of the Open Meeting Law 
- directly affects the Arnolds' property. In tum, Mr. and Mrs. Arnold were unequivocally 
affected by that action, by and through their property rights, and have statutory standing based on 
the plain language ofldaho Code§ 67-2347(6). Therefore, the Arnolds properly filed suit within 
the thirty (30) day time period required by Idaho Code§ 67-2347. (R. at p. 8.) It is, of course, on 
this point that this Appeal turns. 
Despite its bald reference to "the considerable case precedent governing the law of 
standing," the City has failed to cite even a single relevant case where the issue at hand was, as 
here, based on statutorily-conferred standing rather than the more limited Article III standing. 
(See Respondent's Brief, p. 9, n. 22 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).) 
In point of fact, the City has failed to articulate a cogent legal argument that takes into account 
(and fulfills) either the plain language or the intent of the Idaho Open Meeting Law. As the City 
has acknowledged, "where statutory language is unambiguous, . . . other extrinsic evidence 
should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature." 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 6 (citing Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Afed. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 265 
P.3d 502 (2011)).) Because it is undisputed that the Arnolds, by and through their affected 
property rights, were affected by the action taken by the City Council at the meeting held in 
violation of the requirements of the Idaho Open Meeting Law, the plain language of Idaho Code 
§ 67-2347(6) unambiguously confers standing upon them to challenge that action, and the 
District Court's decision otherwise should be reversed. 
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II. ARGlTMENT 
The City's advances only two arguments in favor of upholding the District Court's 
decision, both of which are flawed as a matter oflaw. First, the City asks this Court to ignore the 
plain intent of the Idaho Legislature to allmv broad access to the courts for any person who is 
affected by a violation of the Open Meeting Law, in favor of the more burdensome test for 
Article III standing. Second, the City argues that an Open Meeting Law challenge is not the 
appropriate means to challenge Ordinance 189, as the Arnolds have the ability to make a 
substantive challenge to the Ordinance by way of other means (takings action, declaratory 
judgment action). 1 The Arnolds will address these arguments in turn. 
A. The City's Reliance On Principles Of Article III Standing Is Flawed. 
As noted in the Opening Brief in this Appeal, the District Court seemed to recognize, by 
not addressing Article III and instead focusing on the relevant language of Idaho's Open Meeting 
Law, that where a relevant statute specifically confers standing upon a certain class of people to 
challenge conduct or action, that statute supersedes the otherwise-typical standing analysis under 
Article III of the United States Constitution. (R. at 182-183.) The District Court did not accept 
the City's invitation to analyze the Arnolds' case from an Article III perspective (Id.), and the 
Arnolds respectfully contend that this Court should similarly reject that approach. 
1 While it is true that there may be other means by which the Arnolds could challenge Ordinance 
189, it is fallacious to suggest that the existence of those other means necessarily precludes 
the operation of an Open Meeting Law challenge. 
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Though Idaho Courts have not addressed the specific issue at hand, the Nevada Supreme 
Court, in addressing standing under that sister state's Open Meeting laws, previously has. 
Addressing a challenge to the plaintiffs standing based on traditional, Article III standing 
requirements (as argued here by the City), in the context of rights conferred by a specific state 
statute (as argued here by the Plaintiffs), the Nevada court articulated the proper and most logical 
standing requirements: "State courts are free to adopt a 'case or controversy' justiciability 
requirement [or open their courts to lawsuits that may not meet this requirement.]" Stockmeier 
v. Nevada Dept. of Corrections Psychological Review Panel, 122 Nev. 385, 393, 135 P.3d 220, 
225 (Nev. 2006). Rejecting the argument that Article III standing must be shown in every case, 
regardless of legislative intent, the Nevada Court rightly and fairly determined that "where the 
Legislature has provided the people of Nevada with certain statutory rights, we have not required 
constitutional standing to assert such rights but instead have examined the language of the statute 
itself to determine whether the plaintiff has standing to sue." Id. at 226. "To do otherwise would 
be to bar the people of Nevada from seeking recourse in state courts whenever the Legislature 
has provided statutory rights that are broader than constitutional standing would allow." Id. See 
also Rabin v. Bartlesville Redevelopment Trust Auth., 2013 OK CIV APP 72, 308 P.3d 191, 193 
(Okla. Civ. App. 2013) (where a plaintiff can "rely on a statute or constitutional provision to 
authorize invoking the judicial process," it need not meet the typical requirements of the standing 
test). In Stockmeier, the Nevada Supreme Court was faced with the application of Nevada's 
Open Meeting laws that conferred a right to file a civil action on "[a]ny person denied a right 
conferred by [Nevada Revised Statutes Chapter 241 ]." Id. The circumstances in the present case 
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are and this Court should respectfully reach the same decision, granting the same 
deference to the Legislature, as the Nevada court did in Stockmeier. 
In support of its contention that the Arnolds do not have standing, the City asserts that 
both Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and Halvorson v. North Latah County Highway District 151 
Idaho 196, 204, 254 P.3d 497, 505 (2011) ought to provide the test in this case for whether the 
Arnolds have standing. (Respondent's Brief, p. 9.) In so doing, the City necessarily ignores the 
plain language of the relevant statute, even after asserting that the plain language of the statute 
ought to govern (Id. at pp. 5-6), instead drawing on the test for standing and procedural due 
process in cases where there is no direct statute speaking to those issues. The City does not cite a 
single case in which there is a statute directly on point, as here, but where this Court nevertheless 
ignored the intent of the legislature in the plain language of that statute and instead applied the 
Article III test for determining a party's standing. 
Though it appears that the City disfavors a statutory scheme that permits any affected 
person from bringing a lawsuit - a standard that notably does not "open the courthouse doors" 
for a lawsuit by simply any person who cannot establish how he is affected - the policy 
discussion that underlies the City's argument is not appropriately had in this Court. See Stringer 
v. Robinson, 155 Idaho 554, 314 P.3d 609, 613 (Nov. 27, 2013) (citing Grazer v. Jones, 154 
Idaho 58, 66, 294 P.3d 184, 192 (2013) ("We decline to do violence to the plain language of 
Idaho Code § 5-215 in the name of uniformity .... [W]e are not at liberty to depart from the 
plain meaning of a statute for policy reasons.")); Verska, 151 Idaho at 895 (the Courts "must 
follow the law as written. If it is socially or economically unsound, the power to correct it is 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 8 l 93 72-00 I / 697996 
legislative, not judicial." (Citing Herndon v. West, 87 Idaho 335, 393 35 (1 If the 
City does not like the breadth with which the statute was written, it must address those concerns 
before the Legislature. 
B. The Fact That The Arnolds' Substantive Property Rights \Vere Affected By 
Ordinance 189 Is Sufficient To Establish Standing Under Idaho Code§ 67-2347(6). 
The City's second argument for affirming the District Court's denial of standing to the 
Arnolds, in actuality, has nothing to do with the doctrine of standing. Rather, the City pivots 
away from the standing issue to the entirely separate and distinct legal concept of procedural due 
process. (Respondent's Brief, p. 10.) The second argument, therefore, has nothing to do with the 
decision actually made by the District Court and appears instead to be an appeal to this Court to 
find an alternate means to excuse its admitted violations of the Idaho Open Meeting Law. 
However, as evidenced by the case law cited by the City in its m:vn brief, the legal concepts of 
standing and procedural due process are separate and do not always align. For purposes of this 
Appeal, concerning onlv whether the District Court properly found that the Arnolds lacked 
standing, the City's diversion to principles of procedural due process is misplaced.2 
More importantly, however, is the fact that the Idaho Legislature, in drafting the Idaho 
Open Meeting Law and as noted in the previous section, clearly and unequivocally set forth its 
2 See Ciszek v. Kootenai County, 151 Idaho 123, 254 P.3d 24 (2011) (cited in Respondent's 
Brief, p. 10, n. 23 .) In Ciszek, this Court found that the Appellants did have standing to bring 
their action, but held in a separate section under a different analysis that there was no 
procedural due process violation according to the facts specific to that case. 151 Idaho at 
128-130. Here, the only relevant inquiry is whether the Arnolds had standing. By the 
applicable standard set forth in Idaho Code§ 67-2347, it is plain that they do. 
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to allow greater access to courts citizens affected by actions of their local and state 
governmental entities. 
A procedural due process inquiry is focused on determining 
whether the procedure employed is fair. The due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment "prohibits deprivation of life, liberty, 
or property without 'fundamental fairness' through governmental 
conduct that offends the community's sense of justice, decency and 
fair play." Maresh v. State of Idaho Dep't of Health and Welfare, 
132 Idaho 221, 225-26, 970 P.2d 14, 19-20 (1998) citing Moran v. 
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432-34, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1146-47, 89 
L.Ed.2d 410, 428-29 (1986). Procedural due process is the aspect 
of due process relating to the minimal requirements of notice and a 
hearing if the deprivation of a significant life, liberty, or property 
interest may occur. 
Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 72, 28 P.3d 1006, 1015 (2001). With respect 
to the Idaho Open Meeting Law, the Idaho Legislature has legislatively codified guidance as to 
certain aspects of what "governmental conduct that offends the community's sense of justice, 
decency and fair play." Thus, when the government does not deny violating the Open Meeting 
Law, as here, concerns of procedural due process are a foregone conclusion. The only issue to 
be addressed in this Appeal is whether the Arnolds are among the class of people legislatively 
selected to enforce these standards. The rest, whether in terms of procedural due process or 
otherwise, is of no moment. 
The City's position in this second argument really demonstrates its willful disregard for 
its statutory obligations under the Idaho Open Meeting Law. Essentially, still without denying 
that it did not follow the requirements and procedures that are clearly set forth in the Open 
Meeting Law, the City asserts that the Arnolds should pursue, instead, a substantive challenge to 
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or declaratory judgment action." (Respondent's Brief, 
p. 10.) In other words, the City would have this Court insulate its seemingly-admitted violations 
of the Idaho Open Meetings Law by requiring affected plaintiffs ( after all, they would not have 
the ability to pursue such claims if they were not affected by the action) to pursue extensive and 
costly litigation, requiring a slate of land use experts, economists, and other aspects of expensive 
and time-consuming litigation, rather than the simple and straightforward process and remedy 
actually prescribed by the Idaho Legislature for straightforward violations of the Idaho Open 
Meeting Law. It is, to borrow a phrase, the epitome of getting to Seattle by way of New York. 
The City's argument in this respect demonstrates the disingenuousness of its earlier-stated 
concern for policy considerations that \Vould "throw[] open the courthouse doors": The City is 
not concerned about judicial efficiency or economy; it merely desires a rubber stamp to be able 
to violate the Open Meeting Law at will, without ensuring the available redress for its citizens 
that the Idaho Legislature has clearly, unambiguously, and broadly allowed. 
Moreover, the only other case law cited by the City to support its contention, that the 
Arnolds have not pursued the appropriate means to challenge its violation, does not support such 
a conclusion. To resist the Arnolds' efforts to hold the City accountable to the standards 
expressly and unequivocally set forth in the Idaho Open Meeting laws, the City relies on Cowan 
v. Board of Commissioners of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 (2006). 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 10, n. 23.) The City relies on Cowan for the proposition that, absent a 
showing of prejudice to a substantial right, a defective notice does not alone give rise to a cause 
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s reliance on Cowan is in fact, Cowan provides the key 
persuasive authority for why the Arnolds' claims herein are appropriate. 
First, this Court in Cowan was not confronted with nor did it decide any question of 
compliance with the Idaho Open Meeting Laws. In fact, the Idaho Open Meeting laws (and the 
code sections relevant thereto) are not once mentioned in the entirety of the Cowan opinion. 
Consequently, there is no discussion in Cowan about the prerequisites for a civil action to have 
governmental action declared null and void under the Open Meeting laws, specifically the 
standing requirements of an aggrieved party. Rather, the portion of Cowan relied upon by the 
City is limited to a discussion about standing under the Fremont County Development Code 
("FCDC"). Not surprisingly, the FCDC does not contain the same or any similar language as the 
Open Meeting laws, permitting any "affected" person to bring an action for enforcement of 
proper notice requirements. With respect to the portion of Cowan relied upon by the City, then, 
it is of no use to this Court in determining whether these Plaintiffs may bring a civil action to 
"requir[e] compliance with the provisions of [the] act." Idaho Code.§ 67-2347(6). 
However, though the portion of Cowan relied upon by the City offers neither binding nor 
persuasive authority on the limited question presented in this Appeal, an earlier section of this 
Court's decision in Cowan is helpful. Before the discussion regarding the propriety of the 
plaintiff's cause of action under the FCDC, this Court addressed the question of "standing" under 
a legislative scheme more closely analogous to the Idaho Open Meeting laws. Analyzing the 
Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA"), the Supreme Court noted that the legislature provided 
for a cause of action by any "affected person to seek judicial review of an approval or denial of a 
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use application .... " Cowan, 1 Idaho at 508 (citing Idaho Code § 67-652i(l)(d)). The 
"affected person" language of LLUP A is synonymous with the language of the Idaho Open 
Meeting laws, referring to any "person affected by" and, the Arnolds contend, provides the 
closest available comparison for purposes of precedential value. 
In the examination of the "affected person" standard under LLUP A, this Court in Cowan 
was presented with the exact same arguments now asserted by the City in the instant Appeal: 
"The Board argues that Cowan has failed to allege a distinct palpable injury or particularized 
harm he has suffered, but has instead only alleged generalized grievances." 143 Idaho at 509. 
The plaintiff, exactly as the Arnolds have alleged in this action, countered that his "land will be 
adversely affected" by "adversely impact[ing] his property rights and diminish[ing] his property 
value." Id. This Court proceeded to reject the Board's argument and found, under the "affected 
person" standard of LLUPA, that Cowan unquestionably "has standing to pursue his claims" 
based on the adverse impacts on Cowan's property, as alleged. 
The analysis is the same here as in Cowan. The District Court did not decide the issue of 
whether the Arnolds' property rights were adversely affected by Ordinance 189. (R. at pp. 182-
183.) Rather, the District Court narrowly interpreted the phrase "affected by", per the City's 
suggestion, to only those persons who were affected by the violation in only one of a multitude 
of possible ways (i.e. those who were unable to be present at the City Council meeting due to the 
deficient notice). However, as this Court found in Cowan, a person may be affected by a 
violation of a statute in many ways, including and especially by a deprivation of private property 
rights by governmental action taken in violation of the Open Meeting Law. 
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CONCLUSION 
broad language of the Idaho Open Meeting Law is clearly designed to prevent 
govenh'llental abuses and to ensure that - in every case - local and state governments operate in 
open, fair, and accessible terms. By the plain language of the Open Meeting Law, the Idaho 
Legislature conferred an enforcement power upon the people whose rights are affected by 
violations and abuses of the government's powers, so that the government will at all times 
remain a tool of the people and for the people, and not above the people. In this case, the City 
has no excuse or explanation as to why it did not follow the plain and simplistic requirements of 
the Open Meeting Law, nor any justification as to why it should not be held accountable for its 
violations. 
Rather, the City seeks to have this Court affirm the decision of the District Court, 
effectively disarming the people from their right and ability to keep the government in check. 
The City has provided no viable legal argument for doing so, nor has it provided any controlling 
or persuasive authority as to why the Arnolds - unquestionably affected by Ordinance 189 -
should not have that right. By the plain language of Idaho Code § 67-2347(6), the Arnolds are 
persons "affected by" the City's violation of the Open Meeting Laws, and therefore had standing 
to bring this action. The Arnolds respectfully request that this Court reverse the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, and remand these proceedings back to the 
District Court for further proceedings consistent with such a decision. 
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IV. ATTORc~EY FEES 
The City has requested an award of attorney fees against the Arnolds, suggesting that the 
Arnolds' Appeal has been made '\vithout a reasonable basis in fact or law." (Respondent's 
Brief, p. 11 (citing Idaho Code § 12-117).) Notwithstanding the fact that the Arnolds do not 
believe that the City should prevail in this Appeal, which would render moot the City's request 
for attorney fees, the Arnolds hereby respond to the City's request. 
In support of its request, the City cites to the "plethora of case law" that supports its 
contentions (Respondent's Brief, p. 11 ), even though it only cited five cases in the portions of its 
Brief discussing the substantive merits of the "standing" issue actually relevant to this Appeal, 
and only one of which (Cowan) actually addressed the question of statutory standing as opposed 
to Article III standing or some other unrelated and irrelevant issue ( e.g. procedural due process). 
Even then, the one relevant case that it cited, Cowan, included a determination by this Court that 
the plaintiff therein did, in fact, have statutory standing. 
The fact of the matter is that the scope of persons statutorily conferred standing to 
enforce the Idaho Open Meeting Law is a question that has never before been addressed by this 
Court. Where matters of first impression are involved, this Court has often declined to award 
fees to the prevailing party. See St. Luke's lvfagic Valley Reg'l Med Ctr., Ltd v. Bd of Cnty. 
Comm'rs of Gooding Cnty., 149 Idaho 584, 591, 237 P.3d 1210, 1217 (2010); Smith v. Idaho 
Dep't of Labor, 148 Idaho 72, 76,218 P.3d 1133, 1137 (2009); Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr. 
v. Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 862, 863, 204 P.3d 502, 503 (2009). Moreover, as the City has focused 
its argument against the Arnolds' standing on the requirements of Article III standing, which 
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state courts have disagreed "vith suggests a broader 
class of individuals who have standing, the Arnolds have not appealed without a reasonable basis 
in fact and law under Idaho's Open Meeting Law. See Smith, 148 Idaho at 76. It is fmiher 
telling that, with the exception of the Cowan case that actually favors the Arnolds' position, the 
City has abandoned all of the case law on which it previously relied and which has been 
addressed in Appellants' Opening Brief. The only issue that actually lacks a basis in fact or law 
here is the notion that this Court should abandon the clear and unambiguous statutory standing 
conferred by the Idaho legislature, in favor of a more narrow reading that protects the City 
against accountability for its own, acknowledged violations of the law. 
The Arnolds' appeal is consistent with the purpose and intent of the Idaho Open Meeting 
Law, as well as the letter of the law. The City has not denied that it simply failed to abide by the 
provisions of that law, and is therefore attempting to evade review by challenging the Arnolds' 
standing despite the broad language employed by the Idaho Legislature. Yet, in a bit of irony, it 
is the City that accuses the Arnolds of "false pretenses." (Respondent's Brief, p. 11.) The City 
did not follow the Open Meeting Law in passing Ordinance 189, and the Arnolds are property 
owners directly affected by Ordinance 189. This appeal is grounded in those facts, and 
supported directly by the plain language of Idaho Code § 67-234 7 ( 6), which emphasizes both the 
government's decision and the action that results therefrom. Standing for the Arnolds is further 
buttressed by the very case law upon which the City has relied most consistently throughout 
these proceedings, Cowan, even though the City continues to ignore the relevant section of that 
decision that speaks to statutory standing. 
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from the Arnolds' request that this 
Court reverse the District Court's decision and remand this case, the Arnolds respectfully request 
that this Court deny the City's request for Attorney Fees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of September, 2014. 
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht PA 
By --;t.;-rq~ 
Fredric V. Shoemake 
Thomas J. Lloyd III 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the z<ctay of September, 2014, a true and correct copy 
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Paul J. Fitzer 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
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